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INTRODUCTION
Children, in nation-states across the globe, have repeatedly 
been recruited or forced to serve as child soldiers, aiding 
governmental or armed rebel groups in furthering their 
respective objectives within internal armed conflicts. 
Researchers estimate that “hundreds of thousands of children 
under the age of [eighteen] serve” as child soldiers in various 
nation-states across the globe.1 Countries such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Libya are internationally recognized as ranking 
among the most salient and worst offenders of the international 
community’s ban against the use of child soldiers in states’
internal armed conflicts.2 In efforts to curtail the global 
proliferation and prolonged use of child soldiers, various nations 
have resorted to drafting and enforcing multilateral and unilateral 
sanctions against states that continue to recruit and retain child
soldiers. States’ implementation of unilateral sanctions, in 
particular, raises several questions for the international 
community. Do unilateral sanctions offend international
sovereignty standards? If not, how effective are they? What 
1. See Facts About Child Soldiers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 3, 
2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/03/facts-about-child-soldiers
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch].
2. Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking 
in Persons Report 2012: Topics of Special Interest, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/192359.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2014).
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factors render unilateral sanctions counterproductive? Why do 
nation-states such as the United States, a United Nations
member state,3 implement unilateral sanctions when it simply 
builds in handicap clauses that prevent the sanction from being 
enforced?
However well intentioned or masterfully drafted, unilateral 
economic sanctions, in application, often undermine the core 
original objective they were drafted to achieve. Is this an 
inherent effect of these sanctions, or can they be fine-tuned to
better serve human rights needs across the world? Unilateral 
economic sanctions are merely one-sided penalties or 
economically coercive measures that a state exercises against a
foreign state when the foreign state has failed to comply with
particular rules or orders.4 First, Part II of this note will
provide background information regarding child soldiers, their 
treatment, factors that make children vulnerable to becoming 
child soldiers, and lingering effects that often plague former 
child soldiers. Afterward, Part III of this note will address the
United States’ connection to the United Nations, the applicable 
extraterritorial obligations resulting from that connection, and 
the ways in which the United States may fulfill those obligations. 
Next, Part IV will provide a general discussion of key criticisms
and suggestions on states’ use of unilateral sanction. Thereafter,
Part V will address the current weaknesses of the United States’
Child Soldiers Protection Act of 2008 and recommend 
amendments that will enable the act to actively reduce the use 
and retention of child soldiers around the world.
3. Tracey B. C. Begley, The Extraterritorial Obligation to Prevent the 
Use of Child Soldiers, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 613, 618, 628-29 (2012) 
[hereinafter Begley]. The U.S. is one of one hundred and ninety-three countries 
that are voluntary UN member states subject to the UN’s UN Charter, goals, 
and objectives. Id.
4. See BLACK’S LAS DICTIONARY 1671 (9th ed. 2009) (citing the word 
“unilateral.”).
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PART I: THE INTERNATIONAL IDENTIFICATION & EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILD SOLDIERS
A. Defining the Term “Child Soldier”
The term “child soldier” is a broad concept that is not 
generally reserved only to reference children who participate in
direct combat.5 Children who perform actions or services, 
combat-focused or not, meant for the furtherance of an armed 
group’s objectives are also considered child soldiers.6 Child 
soldiers commonly serve in lesser-acknowledged roles, namely 
as porters, “lookouts, messengers, cooks, or other routine duties. 
Girls are particularly vulnerable [as] [t]hey are often forced to 
serve as sexual slaves.”7 Child soldiers are also used to generate 
revenue, which helps armed groups’ finance various activities.8
Generally, the children generate income by mining for precious 
natural resources such as oil and diamonds, or by trafficking
drugs.9 The United Nations, referencing The Paris Principles10,
defines child soldiers as “any person below 18 years of age who 
is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or
armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to
children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies
5. Diane A. Desierto, Leveraging International Economic Tools to 
Confront Child Soldiering, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 337, 343 (2011) 
[hereinafter Desierto].
6. See id.
7. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, Child Recruitment: Combat and Support Roles, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-
conflict/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter U.N. Child Recruitment]; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 1.
8. See Desierto, supra note 5, at 348.
9. Id. at 348-49.
10. See generally The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on 
Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, UNICEF (Jan. 30, 
2007), http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf 
(defining child soldiers).
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or for sexual purposes.”11 Unfortunately, children’s ability to 
serve in many varying capacities makes the children targets for 
recruitment.
B. The Targeting and Treatment of Child Soldiers
Armed groups view children as easy targets for recruitment, 
in part, because children experiencing economic and social 
misfortune in war-torn environments tend to be easier to 
manipulate.12 According to Human Rights Watch, “[c]hildren are 
most likely to become child soldiers if they are poor, separated 
from their families, displaced from their homes, living in a 
combat zone[,] or have limited access to education.”13 In fact, 
armed groups often facilitate the occurrence of these 
stigmatizing factors by forcing children to commit heinous 
crimes against “their own families and neighbors.”14 In some 
cases, surprisingly, impoverished parents offer their children to 
armed groups in exchange for some level of financial relief.15
Many armed groups also target children simply because they are 
“young, immature, impressionable, and physically smaller than 
adults.”16 Armed groups often kidnap children and force them to 
serve as child soldiers under threat of violence or death.17
Child soldiers are abused and mistreated in just as many ways 
as they are recruited. The United Nations Security Council has 
recognized six separate types of violations against children, 
commonly referenced as “the six grave violations,” which 
include the “killing or maiming of children[,] recruitment or use 
11. U.N. Child Recruitment, supra note 7.
12. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH , supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Sara A. Ward, Criminalizing the Victim: Why the Legal Community 
Must Fight to Ensure That Child Soldier Victims are Not Prosecuted as War 
Criminals, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821, 825 (2012) [hereinafter Ward] (citing 
UNICEF, Child Soldiers 1 (July 26, 2000)), available at
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus /briefing/soldiers/ soldiers.pdf.
16. Begley, supra note 3, at 614.
17. See id.
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of children as solders[,] sexual violence against children[,] 
attacks against schools or hospitals[,] denial of humanitarian
access for children[,] [and the] abduction of children.”18 Child 
soldiers often experience abuse in several of the aforementioned 
areas, which the international community has taken a stand 
against. For instance, while serving governmental or armed 
groups, children are often murdered, raped, burned alive, or 
forced to commit similar acts of violence against civilians or 
combatants.19 Researchers are also beginning to notice a rising 
trend where children are used on war-related suicide missions.20
In a 2012 interview, Radhika Coomaraswamy, an internationally 
recognized human rights advocate, stated “[w]e are finding in 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq the beginning of the phenomenon 
of child suicide and victim bombers, where children are being 
used to detonate bombs on their bodies or people detonating 
them from afar[,]” identifying the findings of her research as 
horrifying.21
The atrocities that armed groups commit against children are
not limited simply to violence, but extend well into other critical 
areas that are crucial to child development, such as education. 
Traditionally, armed groups have particularly favored targeting 
schools as a means to recruit children into their respective 
regimes.22 “Armed groups go into schools and forcibly recruit or 
sometimes entice children to join them. Schools are also used by 
militaries; they occupy schools and prevent children from 
attending classes because [they are] the only buildings in town 
18. The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed 
Conflict: The Legal Foundation 3 (United Nations Office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
Working Paper No. 1), available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org
/publications/WorkingPaper1_SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf.
19. Ward, supra note 15, at 826.
20. See Fletcher Forum, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: A 
Conversation with Radhika Coomaraswamy, 36 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5, 7 
(2012).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6.
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that can be used.”23 The armed groups’ systematic, predatory 
behavior of plucking children out of school, therefore, 
extinguishes any chance for the affected children to receive an 
acceptable degree of formalized, quality education.
C. Lasting Impacts on Child Soldiers
While the immediate, negative impact that child soldiering 
has on affected children is, without question, immense, much of 
the abuse these children endure is not realized until the warring 
has ceased or until that child has been extricated from service 
during the internal armed conflict. Many child soldiers, due to 
their extended armed service in war-torn environments, face an 
insurmountable societal detriment at the point of reintegration,24
or the process by which the children are reincorporated into
society as equal citizens.25 Child soldiers are often limited by 
lack of education; addiction, whether to alcohol or other drugs; 
consequential sexual activity, which may include sexually 
transmitted diseases or teenage pregnancy; insufficient access to 
healthcare; and by criminal consequences stemming from their 
service as child soldiers.26
1. Physical Displacement
The first and perhaps most immediate issue that a former 
child soldier will likely face is that he or she is physically 
displaced. More times than not, service to a governmental or 
armed group as a child soldier requires the child to be totally 
disconnected from his or her family and neighbors.27 If the
child’s family unit had not previously been dissolved by
23. Id.
24. See Elisabeth Schauer, The Psychological Impact of Child 
Soldiering 2-3 (2009) [hereinafter Schauer], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc636752.pdf.
25. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 650 (11th ed. 2008)
(referencing the (1)(a) listed definition of the word “integration.”).
26. See Schauer, supra note 24, at 3-4.
27. See id. at 7-8.
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poverty, war, or illness, recruiting members of the armed group
likely required the child to kill family members or friends.28
Generally, “[t]he killing takes place in such a way that the whole 
community knows that the [child] has committed the murder. In 
this manner[,] the child is effectively barred from returning to 
the village and per force develops a relationship of dependency 
upon his [or her] captors.”29 Also, many war-torn nation-states 
do not have the means or infrastructure to properly reintegrate 
former child soldiers into society, which heightens the likelihood 
of former child soldiers being re-recruited by armed groups.30
2. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
Former child soldiers also face a wide range of medical
concerns that have the potential to stymie their reintegration into 
society. As a result of extensive exposure to traumatic
occurrences, many former child soldiers develop post-traumatic 
stress disorder, commonly referenced as PTSD. PTSD, an 
anxiety disorder, often afflicts “individuals who have 
experienced or witnessed at least one traumatic event . . . , 
[which] involve[s] actual or threatened death or serious injury . . 
. and the subjective perception of intense fear, helplessness []or
horror.”31 Studies consistently show that post-traumatic stress
reactions persist over large periods of time; the effects of PTSD 
are not generally transitory.32 Studies also show a positive 
correlation between those affected by PTSD and negative,
hostile behavior.33 Former child soldiers, by virtue of their age 
and lack of maturity, often experience debilitating difficulty in 
28. See JA Robinson, The Right of Child Victims of Armed Conflict to 
Reintegration and Recovery, 15 Potchefstroom Electronic L.J. 45, 51-52
(2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRNID2044549
code1435986.pdf?abstractid=2044549&mirid=1.
29. Id. at 52.
30. See id. at 83.
31. Schauer, supra note 24, at 12.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id. at 21.
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managing their fits of aggression and in transitioning into a new 
life, one without violence.34
Affected children can suffer from PTSD for over forty years 
after the initial traumatic event has occurred, and studies indicate 
“a perfectly linear correlation between the number of traumatic 
event types experienced and the likelihood of developing post-
traumatic stress disorder and other disorders of the trauma 
spectrum[.]”35
In a 2007 study of one hundred and sixty-nine former child 
soldiers in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
ninety-two percent of the Ugandan children had witnessed 
shootings and eighty-nine percent witnessed someone being 
wounded.36 Fifty-four percent of the children interviewed
reported that they themselves had killed another human being,
while twenty-eight percent reported that they had been forced to 
engage in unwanted sexual activity.37
In another 2007-2008 study of over eleven hundred Ugandan 
child soldiers, forty-three percent reported that they had been 
abducted; thirty-six percent had been forced to kill another 
human being; and eight percent were forced to skin, cook, or eat 
human flesh.38 Exposure to these and similar experiences 
undoubtedly heightens the likelihood that child soldiers will 
experience PTSD or other trauma induced anxiety disorders,
which can make reintegration extremely difficult.39
34. Id.
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id. at 11-12.
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PART II: THE UNITED STATES’ EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
A. Overview on Extraterritorial Obligations
Although sovereign nation-states typically are not subject to
the laws of other states and entities, they may voluntarily elect
to legally bind themselves to agreements and obligations with 
other nation-states. Extraterritorial obligations are simply duties 
that obligated sovereign states must fulfill concerning states that 
are exempt from the obligated states’ legal jurisdiction.40 Many 
sovereign states, such as the United States (U.S.), have 
recognized that globalization virtually necessitates the
recognition of extraterritorial obligations amongst sovereign
states.41
Technological advancements in travel, commerce, medicine, 
and other areas have intricately interconnected nation-states that 
can be deleteriously impacted by one another’s actions, causing 
chaos.42 Extraterritorial obligations amongst states require not 
only that each state comply with the signed agreement, but also 
that each state does its best to further the objective of the 
agreement.43
B. The U.S.’s Extraterritorial Obligation and the UN 
Charter
The United States, through voluntary, international 
agreements, has taken on extraterritorial obligations, which it 
owes to the UN and other nation-states. The U.S. became a 
United Nations44 (UN) member state on October 24, 1945. As a 
40. See Begley, supra note 3, at 625.
41. See id. at 627-28.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. The UN in Brief: How the UN Works, UNITED NATIONS (2009), 
http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/about.shtml (stating “[t]he United
Nations was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 countries committed to
preserving peace through international cooperation and collective security”).
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UN member state, subject to the Charter of the UN, the U.S. is 
required to “give the [UN] every assistance in any action [the 
UN] takes in accordance with the . . . Charter.”45 Chapter
nine of the Charter, specifically Articles 55 and 56, imputes 
extraterritorial obligations onto the U.S. regarding international 
economic and social matters.46 The UN drafted Article 55 of
the UN Charter to create stable conditions of well being in order 
to promote peaceful communication amongst states. It declares 
that the UN:
shall promote[] higher standards of living . . . and
conditions of economic and social progress . . . ; solutions
of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion.47
The U.S., pursuant to Article two of the UN Charter, is 
therefore required to promote universal respect for human rights 
whenever and wherever possible.
Additionally, Article 56 of the UN Charter further elaborates 
on the types of actions that the UN requires of each UN member 
state pursuant to Article 55.48 Article 56 requires that “[a]ll 
[m]embers pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55.”49 The U.S., as one of the one 
hundred and ninety-three UN member states,50 has contractually 
obligated itself to act in conjunction with other member states 
and on its own in order to promote, among other things, 
45. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5; United Nations, supra note 44
(defining the UN Charter as an international treaty that lays standards for 
international relations among nation-states).
46. See U.N. Charter arts. 55 & 56.
47. Id.
48. See id. art. 56.
49. Id.
50. United Nations, supra note 44 (stating that “[t]oday, nearly every
nation in the world belongs to the UN[;] membership totals 193 countries”).
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universal respect for “human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all.”51 Although not explicitly stated, Articles 55 and 56 of 
the UN Charter arguably create not only territorial obligations, 
but also impute extraterritorial obligations to each UN member 
state.52
The contention that the UN Charter imputes extraterritorial 
obligations to each UN member state is further supported by the 
very nature and organization of the UN. The UN, structurally, is 
a multilateral body,53 which seeks to promote international 
cooperation among states and encourage the development and 
codification of international law.54 Each UN member state is 
considered part of the Organization’s General Assembly and is 
allotted one vote for each question discussed within the
Assembly’s regular annual sessions.55 As a function of this 
multilateral organization, members of the General Assembly are 
allowed, generally by a majority vote of two-thirds of present 
and voting member states, to “discuss any questions or any 
matters within the scope of the present Charter” and to “make 
recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state 
or states concerned.”56 Each time a UN member state casts a vote 
regarding a human rights related question affecting another state 
or collection of states, it is recognizing its Article 55 and 56
obligation set forth in the Charter of the UN.57 The
aforementioned member state, by voting, will have participated 
51. United Charter, supra note 45, art. 55 & 56.
52. See Begley, supra note 3, at 629-30 (stating “[s]ince Article 56
obligates all UN members states to uphold, through whatever means
possible, the provisions of Article 55[,] including the universal respect for
human rights, it can be argued that this creates an extraterritorial obligation
for states to support human rights in other countries”).
53. The term multilateral, in this context, applies to anything that
involves or is agreed upon by more than two nation- states. See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2013), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/multilateral (referencing the second of multilateral
definition listed).
54. See U.N. Charter art. 13.
55. Id. art. 18; see id. arts. 9 & 20.
56. U.N. Charter art. 11, para. 2.
57. See id. arts. 55 & 56.
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in a joint action to promote the respect of universal human rights, 
assuming that the voting member state voted in good faith and in 
furtherance of the UN’s objectives.58 Therefore, by merely 
voting in good faith, each UN member state, including the U.S., 
recognizes and partially satisfies the extraterritorial obligations 
imputed onto it under Article 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.59
While most UN member states acknowledge that the UN 
imputes multilateral, extraterritorial obligations, in some degree, 
to each member state, states draw the line when it comes to 
states imposing unilateral extraterritorial obligations, especially 
unilateral economic sanctions, on other nation-states.60 Multiple 
UN member states such as Argentina, Cuba, and Jamaica 
emphatically contend that UN membership does not create 
extraterritorial obligations that authorize member states to 
promulgate unilateral economic measures on other nations as a 
means of facilitating political or economic coercion.61 In fact, 
several UN member states regard the use of unilateral economic 
sanctions as adverse to the very objectives of the UN.62 Each of 
them, more or less, argue that “[u]nilateral coercive measures 
adversely affect the prospects for economic development of 
developing countries, distort trade and investment flows, infringe 
the sovereignty of [s]tates[,] and create obstacles to the full 
enjoyment of human rights by peoples and individuals under the
jurisdiction of other [s]tates.”63 These assertions, however, come 
across as overly broad and misleading. As previously stated, 
58. Id.
59. Id. arts. 2, 55 & 56.
60. See U.N. Secretary-General, Unilateral Economic Measures as a
Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries:
Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 3-8, U.N. Doc. A/60/226 (Aug. 12, 2005).
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 8; see generally U.N. Secretary-General, Unilateral
Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against 
Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary- General, U.N. Doc. A/62/210 
(Aug. 6, 2007) (providing additional examples of UN member states’ stances 
on whether UN membership creates an extraterritorial obligation or right, held 
by each UN member state, to employ unilateral economic sanctions).
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Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter not only allow, but require 
UN member states to take separate actions, in addition to its joint 
actions, to promote universal respect for human rights.64 A
unilateral economic sanction quite certainly constitutes separate 
action on the part of the enacting state. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that unilateral economic sanctions categorically offend the 
objectives of the UN.
C. The U.S. as a Party to the UN-Adopted Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict
The U.S., through its continued involvement with the UN, 
also elected to become a party to other UN-adopted treaties that, 
themselves, reinforce the UN member states’ extraterritorial 
obligation to carry out separate actions toward the treaties’
objectives when feasible.65 The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC), which is a multilateral 
treaty that seeks to promote the recognition of universal human
rights, is a more recent example of such an agreement.66 The 
General Assembly of the UN adopted the OP-CRC in May of 
2000, and entered it into force in February of 2002.67 Shortly 
thereafter, the U.S. became a signatory to the OP-CRC on July 5, 
64. See U.N Charter arts. 55 & 56.
65. See generally Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Jul. 5, 2000 2173
U.N.T.S. 236-37 (referencing language that requires signatories to work
separately and in conjunction with other states and organizations to 
implement the OP-CRC).
66. See id. at 2.
67. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, The Six Grave Violations, The Six Grave
Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal Foundation,
UNITED NATIONS 1, 18 (2009), http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org
/publications/WorkingPaper1_SixGraveViola tionsLegalFoundation.pdf.
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2000 and later ratified the agreement on December 23, 2002.68
The U.S. is one of one hundred and twenty- nine signatories to 
the international treaty and one of one hundred and fifty-one 
nations that are parties to the treaty.69
Parties to the OP-CRC collectively “condemn[] the targeting 
of children in situations of armed conflict and direct attacks on 
objects protected under international law, including places 
generally having a significant presence of children, such as 
schools and hospitals.”70 In so doing, each party obligates itself 
to implement both territorial and extraterritorial actions 
orchestrated in accordance with and for the furtherance of the 
objectives enumerated within the OP-CRC.71 One of the central 
OP-CRC territorial obligations that each state party must comply 
with can be found within the first three items of Article three of 
the OP-CRC, which read as follows:
1. States Parties shall raise the minimum age for the
voluntary recruitment of persons into their national armed 
forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3, of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, taking account of the 
principles contained in that article and recognizing that under 
the Convention persons under 18 are entitled to special 
protection.
2. Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration
upon ratification of or accession to this Protocol that sets 
forth the minimum age at which it will permit voluntary 
recruitment into its national armed forces and a description of 
the safeguards that it has adopted to ensure that such 
recruitment is not forced or coerced.
3. States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into
their national armed forces under the age of 18 shall maintain 
safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that:
68. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 65, at 3.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id. at 2.
71. See generally id.
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a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;
b) Such recruitment is done with the informed consent of
the person[‘]s parents or legal guardians;
c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in
such military service;
d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to
acceptance into national military service.72
In sum, items one through three of Article three require that 
each state party either raise its minimum voluntary military 
recruitment age to eighteen or provide safeguards that ensure 
that each recruit (1) joined its armed forces voluntarily and with 
the permission of his or her legal guardians, (2) acknowledged 
he or she fully understood his or her duties prior to recruitment, 
and (3) provided reliable proof of his or her age.73 The 
aforementioned portion of Article three undoubtedly deals 
specifically with territorial obligations; however, Article seven 
of the UN adopted OP-CRC contains extraterritorial obligations 
that allow state parties to take unilateral action to further the OP-
CRC’s objectives.
Article seven of the OP-CRC, on first glance, may appear to 
mandate territorial obligations, but the Article’s language 
specifically addresses procedure that state parties must follow 
when taking action to either assist or prevent the actions of other 
nations states, depending on whether those actions will help or 
hinder OP-CRC objectives.74 Article seven contain two items, 
which read as follows:
1. States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of
the present Protocol, including in the prevention of any 
activity contrary to the Protocol and in the rehabilitation and 
social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary 
72. Id. art. 3.
73. See id.
74. See id. art. 7.
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to this Protocol, including through technical cooperation and 
financial assistance. Such assistance and cooperation will be 
undertaken in consultation with concerned States Parties and 
relevant international organizations.
2. States Parties in a position to do so shall provide
such assistance through existing multilateral, bilateral or
other programmes, or, inter alia, through a voluntary fund 
established in accordance with the rules of the General 
Assembly.75
The concluding sentence of Article seven, item one requires 
that each state party to OP-CRC consult with any state party and 
international organization that may be concerned with, or may 
have a vested interest in, whether and to what extent the acting 
state will provide technical or financial assistance to a particular 
state.76 If this item were to refer merely to territorial obligations, 
it would not likely incorporate language regarding other 
sovereign states, describing those states as “concerned.” Each 
party to the OP-CRC is a sovereign nation-state and is, by 
definition, “vested with [the] independent and supreme
authority”77 to implement the requirements of the OP-CRC 
within its own boundaries. Moreover, it is not likely that a 
sovereign nation would need to consult with other “relevant 
international organizations[,]”78 other than the UN, to implement 
its own obligations. The provision was likely included as an 
extraterritorial obligation and as a means by which a state party 
may influence another nation-state to comply with the objectives 
set forth by the OP-CRC.
The language of Article seven, item two further supports the 
contention that the UN- backed OP-CRC does indeed allow state 
parties to satisfy their extraterritorial obligations through 
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Black’s, supra note 4, at 1523 (referencing the definition of the 
word “sovereign”).
78. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 65, art. 7.
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unilateral actions. Item two requires each capable state party to 
provide the aforementioned technical cooperation and financial 
assistance through, at minimum, one of three methods— (1) 
“existing multilateral, bilateral or other programmes[;]”79 (2) 
other unspecified means; or (3) “through a voluntary fund 
established in accordance with the rules of the General 
Assembly.”80 Under the first option, the option mentions other
programs as distinctly separate from multilateral or bilateral
agreements.81 Therefore, any state party that has a pre-existing, 
unilateral program capable of satisfying this obligation can apply 
that program to satisfy this extraterritorial obligation.82 The
second listed option allows state parties to comply by other 
unlisted means.83 Item two, prior to listing the third option,
used the Latin term, “inter alia,” which, when literally
translated, means “[a]mong other things.”84 This may be another
basis by which the OP-CRC allows fulfillment of state parties’ 
extraterritorial obligation through unilateral state action. Lastly, 
option three allows compliance through voluntary funds, 
provided that the funds comply with UN General assembly 
rules.85 By virtue of each state party’s sovereignty and the fact 
that Article seven, item two’s fund creation option is not 
mandatory per the OP-CRC, any state party that elects to create 
such a voluntary fund will make the decision to do so 
unilaterally, despite the fact that the OP-CRC is a multilateral 
treaty.
Although some UN member states, and perhaps some non-
member states, regard states’ use of unilateral economic 






84. Black’s, supra note 4, at 883 (referencing the definition of the 
phrase “inter alia”).
85. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 65, art. 7.
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non- intervention and territorial jurisdiction,”86 the fact remains 
that unilateral economic sanctions do not categorically offend 
international law or the UN Charter. Both the Charter of the UN 
and the UN-adopted OP-CRC impute extraterritorial obligations, 
which allow, and at times encourage, states’ use of unilateral
action. In fact, in 1986, the UN’s “principal judicial organ[,]”87
the International Court of Justice,88 held that “[e]very [s]tate 
possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own 
political, economic and social systems. . . . The cessation of 
economic aid, the giving of which is more of a unilateral and 
voluntary nature, could be regarded as such a violation only in 
exceptional circumstances.”89 Therefore, state imposed unilateral 
economic actions, like the U.S.’ Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 
2008, cannot be fairly branded as categorical violations of public 
international law principles, especially the principles of 
nonintervention and territorial jurisdiction.
PART III: CRITIQUES OF UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS &
AMERICA’S USE OF THOSE SANCTIONS
While the use of unilateral sanctions does not categorically 
offend international law principles, critics, nevertheless, argue 
that other glaring issues render the practice ineffective and have 
the potential to create tremendous, unnecessary friction within 
86. Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using
Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 
459-60 (2006).
87. The Court, Int’l Ct. of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.
php?p1=1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).
88. The International Court of Justice was organized in June of 1945
by the Charter of the United Nations. Id. The Court was designed to
“settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it 
by [s]tates and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by 
authorized [UN] organs and specialized agencies.” Id. The fifteen judges of the 
Court each serve nine years and are elected by the UN General Assembly and 
the Security Council. Id.
89. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 258 & 278 (June 27).
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the international community.90 For example, the use of unilateral 
sanctions may create an avenue for nation-states to abuse 
economic sanctions, using them as a means to target certain 
states and punish them for unrelated matters. Even if states do 
not generally abuse unilateral economic sanctions in this manner, 
the documented use of these sanctions often leads to the indirect 
marginalization of certain human rights of citizens living within 
the nation-state being sanctioned.91 Taken together, many critics 
surmise that the detriments of unilateral economic sanctions 
greatly outweigh the benefits of the same.92
A. The Selective Use of Unilateral Economic Sanctions 
for Personal Foreign Policy Objectives
One of the most salient concerns that critics mention when 
opposing states’ use of unilateral economic sanctions is that
states will have the ability to apply their respective sanctions 
selectively and according to their own political concerns of the 
given time.93 The U.S., for example, often cited as “the most 
active sanctions proponent in the world,”94 has been accused of 
“seek[ing] to enforce international norms . . . selectively, subject 
to the changing priorities of U.S. domestic politics rather than a 
genuine respect for those norms.”95 The U.S. has used unilateral 
economic sanctions to promote its own foreign policy objectives 
on topical matters such as fighting drug and weapon trafficking, 
discouraging the use and advancement of nuclear weapons, and 
advancing the concept of democracy throughout the world.96 It 
90. See Chuang, supra note 86, at 458-62.
91. See Amy Howlett, Getting “Smart”: Crafting Economic
Sanctions that Respect All Human Rights, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1199-
1202 (2004).
92. Id. at 1222-23.
93. Chuang, supra note 86, at 457.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 458 (citing Peter G. Dachin, U.S. Unilateralism and the
International Protection of Religious Freedom: the Multilateral Alternative,
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33 (2002)).
96. Id. at 457.
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has taken hard, political stands against states in the furtherance 
of its own politics. States such as Cuba, a nation that has been 
subject to consistent U.S. unilateral economic sanctions for 
upwards of fifty years, reference the U.S.’s policies as “‘hostile 
and aggressive.’”97
The U.S., for the announced purpose of promoting respect for 
human rights of citizens in nations around the world, has 
imposed tough unilateral economic sanctions on Cuba, which 
have been opposed by the overwhelming majority of the UN 
General Assembly for approximately twenty years.98 “[F]or the 
two decades [that] the Assembly had been calling for an end to 
the embargo,” says Bruno Eduardo Rodríguez Parilla, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “the United States had not heeded to 
the majority opinion of [UN] Member States.”99 Just as recently 
as 2011, the U.S. reasserted its position on its “economic, 
commercial[,] and financial blockade imposed . . . on Cuba,”
despite the General Assembly’s one hundred and eighty-six 
votes100 in favor of adopting the “world body’s twentieth 
consecutive resolution calling for an end to the measures.”101 The 
U.S.’s unwavering commitment to ignore twenty consecutive 
UN General Assembly resolutions encapsulates critics’ concern 
that unilateral economic sanctions may be manipulated to serve a 
state’s personal foreign policy objectives rather than that of the 
international community at large.102
97. U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 41st & 42nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
GA/11162 (Oct. 25, 2011).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. There were only two votes, the U.S. and Israel, in opposition to
adopting the resolution to end the U.S.’s sanctions imposed on Cuba. Id.
101. Id.
102. See generally id.
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B. The Tendency of Unilateral Sanctions to Undermine 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Human Rights of 
Citizens Within Sanctioned States
Some critics remain opposed to states’ use of unilateral 
economic sanctions because the practice has the potential to 
negatively impact certain classes of human rights, even though 
the sanctions may positively impact other classes of human 
rights.103 As Amy Howlett104 points out, “[t]he international
human rights idea is not monolithic, but rather is subject to
deep internal divisions and controversy.”105 States imposing 
unilateral economic sanctions on other states tend to focus on 
coercing a positive impact on those foreign citizens’ civil and 
political human rights, which are commonly referenced as 
negative rights.106 Negative rights may include rights such as 
“the right to liberty, freedom of thought, and freedom of 
expression.”107 When implementing sanctions that focus on 
advancing foreign citizens’ negative rights, the implementing 
state likely does so “with the assumption that the sanctions will 
cause severe hardship within the target [state].”108 This hardship 
usually manifests through the degradation of foreign citizens’
positive human rights, which encompass economic, social, and 
cultural human rights.109 For example, positive human rights 
generally include things such as “the right to food, the right to 
work, and the right to adequate health care.”110
103. See Howlett, supra note 91, at 1199-1202.
104. Amy Howlett is the author of “Getting ‘Smart’: Crafting Economic
Sanctions That Respect All Human Rights,” a 2004 article published by the 
Fordham Law Review.
105. Howlett, supra note 91, at 1199.
106. Id. at 1199-1200.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1211 (quotation omitted); see Joy K. Fausey, Does the United 
Nations’ Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own 
Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 193, 197 (1994) (referencing 
the fact that economic sanctions are often directed at the collective population 
of the target state).
109. Howlett, supra note 91, at 1199.
110. Id.
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Unilateral economic sanctions, by design, coerce states to act 
or not act by negatively impacting the state’s economy or 
financial stability. Amy Howlett, however, in discussing the 
purpose generally attributed to states’ decision to implement 
unilateral economic sanctions, also sheds light on the effect that 
states intend for these sanctions to have on the citizens within the 
sanctioned state.111 According to Howlett, “sanctions 
[traditionally] have targeted countries, and thus the expected 
scenario is that the population-at-large, experiencing severe 
hardship caused by sanctions, will rise up against its leaders to 
demand change. In another scenario, the leaders acquiesce to the 
demands of sanctions out of guilt.”112 Sanctions that are 
particularly aggressive can often “cause severe human suffering”
to citizens within the sanctioned state or states, thereby 
jeopardizing the positive human rights of citizens living within
the state or states.113 If a sanctioned nation refuses to acquiesce 
to the wishes of the sanctioning nation for an extended period of 
time and the sanction has a large impact on the state, the 
citizens’ positive rights will likely suffer to some extent. “Thus, 
the same sanctions that were imposed to end human rights
violations of a civil and political nature [cause] human rights 
violations of an economic, social, and cultural nature[] in the 
same country.”114 Based upon this concern, many critics 
conclude that unilateral economic sanctions are, at best, 
ineffective, and, at worst, more harmful than beneficial.
C. The Acknowledgement of Unilateral Economic 
Sanctions as a Means to Effectively Develop 
International Human Rights Laws & of Ways to 
Minimize the Practice’s Drawbacks
Some critics, albeit not proponents for the use of unilateral 
economic sanctions, within their respective critiques, 
111. Id. at 1200.
112. Id. at 1211-12.
113. Id.at 1200.
114. Id.
692 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.2
acknowledge that the use of unilateral economic sanctions are on 
the rise and will likely be around for a lengthy period of time, if 
not in perpetuity.115 The use of these sanctions, as Janie 
Chuang116 writes, is seen as a “‘middle road response between 
diplomacy and military action.’”117 It “has become a common 
foreign policy tool,” used to “alter state behavior.”118 Therefore, 
several of those opposed to the unilateral implementation of 
economic sanctions, rather than seek to stop states from using 
them, have chosen to provide recommendations to states, which 
are meant to maximize the noted benefits—and reduce the 
potential detriments—of this type of sanction.119
Unilateral economic sanctions, though heavily scrutinized 
within the international community, actually have been credited 
by scholars with being the spearheading cause for recently 
“strengthened international human rights law,” insofar as they 
“foster[] the growth of international human rights norms.”120
Commentators, such as Sarah H. Cleveland, have concluded that 
unilateral economic sanctions can serve this important and 
unique purpose, despite the traditionally acknowledged negatives 
associated with their method of altering foreign states’
behaviors.121 Sanctions of this sort may actually “assist[] in the 
international definition, promulgation, recognition, and domestic 
internalization of human rights norms.”122 By merely
promulgating unilateral economic sanctions, nation- states
are, in effect, “articulating human rights violations as the 
impetus for imposing sanctions and thereby contributing to state 
practice” of those norms.123
In addition to defining international norms and drawing more 
attention to those norms, states have the compelling power to 
115. Id. at 1220-21.
116. See generally Chuang, supra note 86.
117. Chuang, supra note 86, at 457.
118. Id.
119. See generally Howlett, supra note 91.
120. Id. at 1220.
121. Chuang, supra note 86, at 461.
122. Id.
123. Howlett, supra note 91, at 1222.
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directly enforce their economic sanctions against states that 
violate international human rights norms and laws. The General 
Assembly of the UN does not have this power.124 Albeit 
influential and widely respected, the United Nations General 
Assembly is “empowered to make only non-binding 
recommendations to States on international issues within its 
competence.”125 Therefore, General Assembly resolutions, much 
like the aforementioned twenty consecutive resolutions against 
the U.S.’s continued use of unilateral economic sanctions against 
Cuba, are not binding against UN member states.126 So, “[w]hile 
the [UN] views its treaties and conventions as binding on [s]tate 
[p]arties, it has no police power mechanism to enforce its 
decisions; [UN treaties] are ‘limited by the signatories’
willingness to comply.’”127
This limitation, which negatively impacts the effectiveness
of UN-adopted treaties such as the OP-CRC, “make[s] 
implementing procedures to abolish the use of child soldiers 
unattainable without local and national efforts.”128 Heather L. 
Carmody, capturing this frustration in a 2012 article, writes,
Although the international community has condemned the use 
of child soldiers, military recruiters continue to defy these
international norms. Moral condemnation or treaties 
prohibiting child soldiers often fall on deaf ears in countries
that are torn by internal conflict, civil war, and poverty.
Recruiters [may] have reached such a state of violence that all 
standards of moral and ethical conduct cease to exist or hold 
meaning. Releasing child soldiers may be seen as impractical
124. See Background Information: Functions and Powers of the General 




127. Heather L. Carmody, Note, The Child Soldiers Prevention Act:
How the Act’s Inadequacy Leaves the World’s Children Vulnerable, 43 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 233, 247 (2012).
128. Id. at 248.
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to a militia embroiled in a civil war, where replenishing
combatants is a constant preoccupation.129
Many scholars recognize this limitation of the United Nations 
General Assembly’s resolutions and similarly structured 
multilateral agreements, citing the lack of police power as one 
major hindrance to getting state offenders of international norms 
to respect and follow those norms.130
Andrew Philip of Amnesty International, commenting on
child soldier commanders of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
once stated that such commanders “know it’s a war crime, but 
they seem to believe they’ll never be brought to justice. There is 
a sense of rampant impunity.”131 The U.S. and other influential 
states, on the other hand, may implement unilateral economic 
sanctions that create a direct incentive for sanctioned states to 
observe and comply with international human rights norms, 
which are codified by international entities like the UN. Plainly 
stated, unilateral economic sanctions go a step beyond 
emphasizing the usual moral and ethical implications of a state’s
violation of international human rights law; they target states’
economic stability, which has arguably accelerated offending 
state’s willingness to comply with international human rights 
laws.132
Some scholars, in light of both the known benefits and
drawbacks associated with unilateral economic sanctions, have 
proposed that the U.S. and other nation-states refine the drafting 
process of their future, respective unilateral economic 
sanctions.133 In order for the U.S. to simultaneously strengthen 
both negative and positive human rights through the use of these 
129. Id. (quoting Luz E. Nagle, Child Soldiers and the Duty of
Nations to Protect Children from Participation in Armed Conflict, 19 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 26 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).
130. See, e.g., P.W. Singer, Talk is Cheap: Getting Serious About
Preventing Child Soldiers, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 561, 575 (2004).
131. Id. at 575 (citing Rory Carroll, Sham Demobilisation Hides
Rise in Congo’s Child Armies, THE OBSERVER, Sept. 9, 2003, at 15).
132. See Chuang, supra note 86, at 461.
133. Howlett, supra note 91, at 1232-34.
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sanctions, it should only implement smart sanctions, or sanctions 
that are “narrowly tailored to minimize civilian suffering through 
measures such as visa denials and the freezing of assets.”134
Essentially, unilateral economic sanctions simply lack 
balance when they ignore the positive human rights of citizens 
within the sanctioned state. The thoughtful drafting of sanctions, 
which take into account the entire spectrum of foreign citizens’
human rights, will likely garner more support from the 
international community. Furthermore, the U.S. should 
document and condemn international human rights violations in 
an even-handed, uniform manner.135 Unilateral economic 
sanctions that reflect the application of these recommendations 
may help to promote the full spectrum of foreign citizens’ human 
rights and reduce the potential for sanction to undermine the goal 
of promoting global respect for international human rights law. 
Sanctions that fall short of contemplating all of these
recommendations, like the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of
2008, need to be amended in order to best promote international 
human rights norms.
PART V: THE CHILD SOLDIER PREVENTION ACT OF 2008
A. The Promulgation & Purpose of the CSPA
On December 23, 2008, the U.S. Congress amended the
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 and included Title IV, which is
now known as the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 
(CSPA). The CSPA, given full effect in June of 2009, is a 
unilateral, legislative act that bars the U.S. government from 
providing, among other things, financial assistance to another 
nation-states’ government “that is clearly identified . . . for the 
most recent year . . . as having governmental armed forces or 
government-supported armed groups . . . that recruit child
134. Id. at 1233.
135. Chuang, supra note 86, at 462.
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soldiers.”136 Section 405 of the CSPA also requires the U.S. to 
go on international excursions, conduct thorough investigations
into any reports of child soldier use, and prepare reports that 
document the U.S.’s findings.137
B. Noteworthy Strengths of the CSPA
The CSPA, albeit flawed, has several positive attributes. 
These positive attributes, when coupled with smart reformation 
of the CSPA, could allow the Act to become an excellent tool for 
the advancement of the international community’s interest of 
promoting global respect for and observance of international
human rights norms. The CSPA’s definition of the term
“child soldier,” for example, is appropriately representative of 
international principles, as it is consistent with the OP-CRC’s 
definition. The term extends to:
(i) any person under 18 years of age who takes a direct part in 
hostilities as a member of governmental armed forces;
(ii) any person under 18 years of age who has been 
compulsorily recruited into governmental armed forces;
(iii) any person under 15 years of age who has been 
voluntarily recruited into governmental armed forces; or
(iv) any person under 18 years of age who has been recruited 
or used in hostilities by armed forces distinct from the
armed forces of a state; and
(B)includes any person described in clause (ii), (iii), or (iv)
of subparagraph (A) who is serving in any capacity, including 
in a support role such as a cook, porter, messenger, medic, 
guard, or sex slave.138
136. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 404, 
122 Stat. 5044 [hereinafter CSPA].
137. Id. at § 405.
138. Id. at § 402(2).
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The CRC’s definition of the term “child soldier,” by 
following the UN-adopted OP-CRC’s definition, is in essence 
promoting international human rights norms established by the 
UN. The definition specifically outlines exactly who the 
international community deems to be a child soldier, which,
thereby, standardizes the concept and provides a uniform basis to 
judge whether or not a state has indeed violated international 
human rights norms regarding the use of child soldiers.
Additionally, section 403 of the CSPA,139 which embodies 
Congress’s legislative intentions or what the CSPA references as 
the “sense[s] of Congress,” incorporates the U.S.’s human rights 
extraterritorial obligations found within both the Charter of the 
UN and the OP- CRC. Among other enumerated duties, 
Congress requires:
(1) the United States Government . . . condemn the
conscription, forced recruitment, or use of children by 
governments, paramilitaries, or other organizations;
(2) the United States Government . . . support and, to the 
extent practicable, lead efforts to establish and uphold 
international standards designed to end the abuse of human 
rights described in paragraph (1); [and] . . .
(7) [the] United States diplomatic missions in countries in 
which governments use or tolerate child soldiers [to] . . . 
develop strategies, as part of annual program planning—
(A)to promote efforts to end such abuse of human rights; and
(B) to identify and integrate global best practices, as
available, into such strategies to avoid duplication of 
efforts.140
Section 403(1) of the CSPA plainly condemns the use of child 
soldiers by any state or armed group,141 which candidly aligns 
139. Id. at § 403 (describing “Sense of Congress”).
140. Id. at § 403(1), (2), & (7).
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the interests of the U.S. with the interests of the United Nations 
as outlined in Chapter 9, Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.142
As previously stated, Article 56 of the UN charter requires the 
U.S., as a UN member state, “to take . . . separate action. . . for 
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55,”143 which 
requires the UN to promote “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”144
Sections 403(2) and 403(7) of the CSPA, while also showing the 
U.S.’s commitment to promoting respect for foreign citizens’
human rights, specifically prioritize the promotion of 
international human rights standards or norms over the U.S.’s
own domestic standards, insofar as they may differ.145
Also, Congress seemingly promotes uniformity in the 
application of the CSPA by requiring the Secretary of State to 
produce and publish an annual report that describes “the use of 
child soldiers in each foreign country”146 and by requiring the 
Secretary of State to “formally notify any government identified”
as in violation of the CSPA.147 By requiring an annual report 
including information as to a foreign nation-state’s use of child 
soldiers, the U.S. will be armed with data and, in theory, will be 
better able to apply its unilateral economic sanctions consistently 
and fairly according to each foreign state’s progress or lack 
thereof. Also, the state being sanctioned will be given notice that
it is in violation of international human rights standards, which 
puts the nation on direct notice of its non-adherence to accepted 
international human rights standards. Furthermore, this reporting 
mechanism also provides other nation-states with an opportunity 
to see how they each are perceived by the U.S. and within the 
international community in regard to human rights concerns.
141. Id. at § 403(1).
142. See id.; U.N. Charter, supra note 45, art. 55 & 56.
143. U.N. Charter, supra note 45, art. 56.
144. Id. art. 55.
145. CSPA, supra note 136, at § 403(2), (7).
146. Id. at § 405.
147. Id. at § 404(b)(2).
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Lastly, the unilateral sanctions that may be applied to foreign 
states under the CSPA are appropriately limited to financial aid 
and assistance designated for the development of each eligible 
foreign state’s military.148 The Act “prohibits the following 
forms of assistance to governments that are identified in the list: 
international military education and training, foreign military 
financing, excess defense articles, section 1206 assistance, and 
the issuance of licenses for direct commercial sales of military 
equipment.”149 Therefore, the CSPA does not prohibit the U.S. 
from providing non-military-related humanitarian aid to citizens 
of a nation, whose government has violated the CSPA.150 Based 
upon these aforementioned strengths, the CSPA has a relatively 
sturdy foundation, which squares well with international human 
rights standards held by organizations such as the UN.151
C. Salient Weaknesses of the CSPA
The CSPA, albeit drafted in accordance with international 
human rights standards, tells a very different story when it comes 
to the manner in which the U.S. has applied the legislation.152
Frankly, the Act just does not appear to be applied evenly in the 
interest of promoting global respect for human rights, but seems 
rather to be applied in accordance with the U.S.’s own domestic, 
political objectives and foreign policy interests.153 Furthermore, 
the CSPA lacks specificity and does not provide key benchmarks 
or measures on which the U.S. may base its determination as to 
whether a foreign state is actively doing enough in its mission to 
refrain from using children in armed conflicts.
148. Carmody, supra note 127, at 243; see CSPA, supra note 136, at § 
404(a), (e).
149. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, supra note 2.
150. See generally CSPA, supra note 136 (suggesting that the U.S. may 
provide, for an example, either a passport or a passport card for humanitarian 
reasons).
151. See generally CSPA, supra note 136; U.N. Charter, supra note 45, 
art. 55 & 56.
152. See Chuang, supra note 86, at 458-59.
153. See id.
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1. The National Interest Waiver
The national interest waiver, or section 404(c) of the CSPA, 
allows the President to unilaterally waive the CSPA’s application 
to a nation-state “if [he] determines that such waiver is in the 
national interest of the United States.”154 Any 404(c)(1) waiver 
of funds pursuant to the CSPA will likely occur as a result of a 
nation-state’s human right violations, outlined within the annual 
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report).155 As acknowledged 
by the U.S. Department of State, “[t]he CSPA requires 
publication in the annual TIP Report of a list of foreign 
governments identified during the previous year as having 
governmental armed forces or government-supported armed 
groups that recruit and use child soldiers, as defined in the 
Act.”156
In 2012, the CSPA cited seven countries whose governments
have offended the CSPA.157 Burma, Libya, South Sudan, 
Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo were the offending countries listed within the TIP 
Report.158 Of the seven nation-states listed within the 2012 
report, four were receiving funds under the CSPA at and prior to 
the time that the report was released.159
154. CSPA, supra note 136, at § 404(c)(1).
155. See News: 2012 Trafficking In Persons Report Release,
HUMANRIGHTS.GOV, (June 19, 2012), http://www.humanrights.gov/2012/06/
19/tip-2012/ (stating “[a]s required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA), the TIP Report assesses governments around the world on their 
efforts to combat modern slavery”).
156. Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, supra
note 2 (stating “[t]he determination to include a government in the CSPA
list is informed by a range of sources, including firsthand observation by
U.S. government personnel and research and reporting from various
United Nations entities, international organizations, local and international
NGOs, and international media outlets”).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Memorandum for the Secretary of State on the Child 
Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, THE WHITE HOUSE; OFFICE OF THE PRESS 
SECRETARY (Sept. 8, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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President Barack Obama’s continued, selective choice to 
waive the CSPA’s applicability to certain violating foreign states 
seems to offend the Act’s explicit priority, which is to “support. . 
. and, to the extent practicable, lead efforts to establish and 
uphold international standards designed to end the abuse of 
human rights.”160 Currently, three of those four nation-states, 
which include Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen, continue to 
receive full funding otherwise prohibited by the CSPA due to 
President Obama’s waiver of the Act’s application to those
states.161 President Obama has also allowed the fourth nation-
state, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to receive partial 
funding by exercising his waiver authority.162
The waiver provision, in itself, is not necessarily problematic; 
however, the CSPA’s lack of clarity as to when the President 
should be able to invoke the waiver is, indeed, a concern. The 
“issue for debate,” writes Liana Sun Wyler,163 “is the extent to 
which the waiver option should be exercised and whether 
extensive use of the waiver option can have a negative effect on 
international commitments against human trafficking.”164 For the 
past three years, the President has by and large waived the 
office/2012/09/28/presidential-memorandum-presidential-determination-
respect-child-soldier (evidencing President Obama’s election to waive 
application of the CSPA to four nations in September of 2012); Memorandum 
for the Secretary of State on the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, (Oct. 4, 
2011) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION 2012-01, available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/04/presidential-memorandum-child-
soldiers-prevention-act-2008 (evidencing the four nation application waiver in 
October of 2011); Memorandum for the Secretary of State on the Child 
Soldiers Prevention Act, PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION 2011-4 (Oct. 25, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/25/
presidential-memorandum-child-soldiers-prevention-act (evidencing the four 
nation application waiver in October of 2010).
160. CSPA, supra note 136, at § 403(2).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Liana Sun Wyler, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42497, 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS; INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2013) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R42497.pdf.
164. Id. at 17.
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applicability of the CSPA to offending nation-states subject to its
prohibition.165 More troubling than his consecutive execution of 
these waivers is the vague terminology he uses in order to do so. 
Each of his presidential memorandums pertaining to a waiver of 
the CSPA lack specificity and seem to elevate the U.S.’s own 
foreign policy above the human rights norms of the international 
community at large.166 In 2012, for example, the great majority 
of the President’s terse Presidential Determination merely stated:
Pursuant to section 404 of the Child Soldiers Prevention
Act of 2008 (CSPA) (title IV, Public Law 110-457), I hereby 
determine that it is in the national interest of the United States
to waive the application of the prohibition in section 404(a) 
of the CSPA with respect to Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen; 
and further determine that it is in the national interest of the 
United States to waive in part the application of the 
prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to allow for continued 
provision of International Military Education and Training
funds and nonlethal Excess Defense Articles, and the issuance
of licenses for direct commercial sales of U.S. origin defense 
articles; and I hereby waive such provisions accordingly.167
This excerpt taken from President Obama’s 2012 Presidential 
Determination makes a sweeping, conclusory statement, 
asserting only that the waiver “is in the national interest of the 
United States.”168 While there may very well have been valid
reasons for the President to exercise his waiver option, he did
not provide substantive facts to support his decision.169 The
text lacks context for its assertion and does not indicate what
criteria the President used in order to reach his decision.170
Furthermore, the two previously released Presidential 
Determinations, issued in October of 2010 and 2011, also 
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neglect to identify what criteria the President used in coming to 
his decision to waive the application of the CSPA.171
Moreover, President Obama seems to be applying the act in a 
less than even manner.172 For instance, the President selectively 
waived the Act’s application to Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen, 
yet “for the second year in a row, with[held] portions of U.S. 
military assistance from the Democratic Republic of [the] 
Congo.”173 Critics, such as Bryana Johnson of the Washington 
Times, have begun to draw attention to the U.S. for its selective 
application of the Act.174
Johnson, in a scathing Washington Times article, writes,
Every now and then, some absurdity enacted behind closed 
doors in Washington is uncovered which should leave the 
people of the US with the uncanny feeling that all is not as it 
appears to be. . . . Unfortunately, the bitter truth is that the 
majority of our nation’s leaders allow pragmatism to eclipse 
their ideals on most occasions when the two come into 
conflict. Principles are only good until they get in the way of 
allowing the US to take action. If Libya is working to 
overthrow Gadhafi and our leaders don’t like Gadhafi, they 
are going to back his attackers regardless of whether they 
employ child soldiers or not.175
Johnson also notes that the Obama administration, after using 
the waiver in 2010, referenced the waivers as “one-time 
deal[s].”176 Yet, the President has continued to implement 
subsequent waivers.177 Ultimately, the CSPA’s silence as to what 
171. Id.
172. Jo Becker, The U.S. Can Do More to Keep Children off the 
Battlefield, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
jo-becker/the-us-can-do-more-to-kee_b_1940067 .html.
173. Id.
174. See Bryana Johnson, President Obama Turns His Back On Child 




177. See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 156.
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national interests trump the application of the CSPA has 
rendered the President’s waiver authority overly broad. The 
President’s use of this overly broad waiver authority undermines 
the U.S.’s ability to fulfill its extraterritorial obligations to the 
UN.
In order for the CSPA to be effective in promoting global 
respect for international human rights norms, Congress must 
amend the CSPA, eliminating much of the ambiguity 
surrounding the applicability of the national interest waiver. 
Congress must incorporate explicit criteria, which require the 
President to base his decision as to whether he may or may not 
exercise his authority to waive the Act’s application on solid 
factors or standards. As it stands, the President’s unchecked 
ability to exercise his waiver authority stymies any positive 
impact that the Act could have toward promoting respect for and 
observance of international human rights laws. Without this 
crucial adjustment, the Act’s impact will likely be all but 
nonexistent.
2. The Annual Report to Congress
The CSPA, itself, seems to include provisions that will phase 
out some of the President’s obligations to report his future use of 
waivers to congressional committees.178 Section 405(c), in part, 
requires the President to “submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committee” if a 404(c)(1) waiver is granted 
“during any of the [five] years following the date of the 
enactment of th[e] Act.”179 Therefore, this requirement to report
will no longer be applicable once the remaining balance of the 
five years has lapsed.180 The lifting of this requirement will 
relieve the President of his duty to provide crucial information to 
Congress, information that will show whether the Act is being 
178. CSPA, supra note 136, at § 405(c).
179. Id. at §405(c)(1); see id. at § 404(c)(1).
180. CSPA, supra note 136, at § 405(c).
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applied in accordance with international human rights 
standards.181
Sections 405(c)(1) through (c)(4), listing the information that 
the report must include, requires the President to provide:
(1) a list of the countries receiving notification that they are in 
violation of the standards under this title;
(2) a list of any waivers or exceptions exercised under this 
title; (3) justification for any such waivers and exceptions; and
(4) a description of any assistance provided under this title
pursuant to the issuance of such waiver.182
Congress simply must amend this portion of the Act by 
removing the five-year limitation placed on the President’s
obligation to report his use of the CSPA to Congress. Not 
requiring the President to provide justification for withholding 
funds from or waiving the Act’s application to a particular 
nation-state gives too much unchecked power to the President, 
which exponentially increases the likelihood that the Act will be 
manipulated to serve the interests of the U.S. as opposed to the 
interests of the international community at large.
CONCLUSION
Albeit a practice highly scrutinized by members of the 
international community, nation-states’ implementation of 
unilateral economic sanctions can actually serve to strengthen 
international human rights norms. Sanctions like the CSPA, 
when drafted or amended appropriately, comport with 
international human rights norms, satisfy UN member states’ 
extraterritorial obligations to promote the observance of
international human rights, and help to define, promote, and 
increase global adherence to those standards. The U.S.’s CSPA 
181. Id.
182. Id. at §405(c)(1)-(4).
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has excellent potential, as its stated objectives and definitions
comport with international human rights standards. However, 
the Act will not be effective in strengthening global respect for 
international human rights standards unless Congress further 
limits the Act’s national interest waiver and removes the five-
year life-span placed on the President’s obligation to report his 
use of the CSPA to Congress. The CSPA, as is, grants the 
President excessively broad authority, which must be curtailed 
by Congress. Until that time, the CSPA, sadly, cannot aid the 
U.S. and UN in their global objective to permanently eradicate 
the use and retention of child soldiers in armed conflicts around 
the world.
